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TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEDENTS
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY CONCERNING
TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEDENTS
It is the purpose of this article to provide a means of ready reference to all of the Washington cases, up to and including the 133rd
Washington, which have construed, applied or discussed the statute
of this state which excludes testimony in certain cases by interested
parties as to transactions with persons since deceased.
The statutes upon this subject vary more or less widely in the different states, and no other state has a statute closely resembling ours.
O'Connor v. Slatter, 46 Wash. 308, 89 Pac. 885; Northern Bank &
Trust Co. v. Harmon, 126 Wash. 25, 27; 217 Pac. 8. Hence the
decisions of courts of other states upon this subject are of questionable weight, and the decisions of our own Supreme Court construing
this statute assume an increased importance.
The Washington statute upon this subject :is
as follows:.
"No person offered as a witness shall be excluded from
giving evidence by reason of his interest in the event of the
action, as a party thereto 'or otherwise; but such interest
may be shown to affect his credibility: Provided, however, 1 that in an action or proceeding 2 where the adverse
party 3 sues or defends as executor, administrator, 4 or legal
representative 5 of any deceased person, or as deriving right
or title 6 by, through, or from and deceased person, or as
the guardian or conservator of the estate of any insane
person, 7 or of any minor under the age of fourteen years,
then a party in interest 8 or to the record shall not be admitted to testify 9 in his own behalf 10 as to any transaction 1 had by him with or any statement 12 made to him
by any such deceased or insane person, or by any such minor
under the age of fourteen years: Provided further,13 that
this exclusion shall not apply to parties of record who sue
or defend in a representative or fiduciary capacity, and who
I-See I., page 23.
2 See II., page 25.
3 See III., page 25.
4 See IV., page 26.
5 See V., page 27.
6 See VI., page 27.
7 See VII., page 28.
3 See VIII., page 28.
9 See IX., page 33.
10 See X.. page 33.
11 See XI., page 33.
12 See XIL, page 41.
13 See XIII., page 42.
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have no other or further interest in the action." Remington's Comp. Stat., sec. 1211; Pierce's Code, sec. 7722.

The statute has remained in its exact present form since it was
last amended in 1890 by the addition of the clause "or as deriving
right or title by, through, or from any deceased person." The following references to the statute will show its history and evolution:
L. '54, p. 186, sec. 290; L. '60 p. 63, sec. 284; L. '63 p. 154, sec.
327; L. '67 p. 88, sec. 1; L. '69 p. 103, sec. 384;L. '73 p. 106, sec.
382; L. '77 p. 85 , sec. 391; Code '81, sec. 389; L. '90 p. 91, sec. 1;
Huntley Code, sec. 763; 2 Hill Code, sec. 1646; Code of '96 (McLaughlin), sec. 4214; Ballinger's Code, sec. 5991; Remington and
Ballinger's Code, sec. 1211; Remington's Code (1915), sec. 1211;
Rem. Comp. Stat., sec. 1211; Pierce's Code (1912), title 81, sec.
1027; Pierce's Code (1919, 1921, 1923), sec. 7722.
The cases will be grouped under fhe following headings:

I. What is the general purpose of the statute and how
construed? ..............................................
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III. T he adverse party ........................................
25
IV. Executor, Administrator, etc ..................................
26
V. Legal representative ........................................
27
VI. Deriving right or title through the deceased ..................
27
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28
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28
28
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31
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32
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33
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WHAT IS GENERAL

PURPOSE

OF

THE

STATUTE

AND

How

CONSTRUED

The general principle of statutory construction is stated as follows
in 36 Cyc. 1106, 1110, 1162.
"The great fundamental rule in construing statutes is
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. This intention, however, must be the intention as
Every statute must be conexpressed in the statute.
strued with reference to the object intended to be accomplished by it. In order to ascertain this object, it is proper
to consider the occasion and necessity of its enactment, the
defects or evils in the former law, and the remedy provided
by the new one; and the statute should be given that construction which is best calculated to advance its object.
The proviso should be construed together with the
enacting clause, with a view to giving effect to each and to
carrying out the intention of the legislature as manifested
in the entire act. The enacting clause is, of course, the
principal part of the statute, and as its terms may be presumed to have embodied the main object of the act, the
proviso should be strictly construed."
What is the main object and intent of this statute? It will be
noted that it is composed of three parts: (1) the enacting clause;
(2) the proviso, and (3) the proviso to the proviso. Some of the
cases have emphasized the theory that the main object of the statute
is found in the enacting clause which is general in its language, and
therefore that the proviso, which carves a special exception out of
the enacting clause and renders evidence inadmissible which would
otherwise be competent, is to be strictly construed, not extended
beyond its language, and takes no case out of the enacting clause
which does not fall clearly within the terms of the proviso. Sackman
v. Thomas, 24 Wash. 660, 673, 64 Pac. 819; In re Cunningham's
Estate, 94 Wash. 191, 193, 161 Pac. 1193.
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Other cases have placed emphasis upon the proviso and stressed
the theory that the main purpose of the statute is to exclude all
testimony by interested parties relating to transactions with persons
since deceased or statements made by them, and should be interpreted
more or less liberally in order to carry out this general purpose and
intent. For example, in Nicholson v. Kilbury, 80 Wash. 500, 141
Pac. 1043, the Court held that although the statute did not expressly
exclude testimony as to statements made by the decedent to a third
person in the presence of, but not to, the interested witness, nevertheless that such testimony is inadmissible "under the doctrine of
necessary implication."
The general purpose of the statute is stated as follows in Bay
View Brewing Company v. Grubb, 31 Wash. 34, 38-9, 71 Pac. 553:
"The object of the statute clearly was that, where one of
the parties to a transaction or contract is dead, the mouth of
the other is closed concerning that transaction .....
.By
this statute parties are placed upon a footing of absolute
equality. One may testify when the other may. But when
one of the parties to the contract or transaction is dead,
then the other cannot be heard to speak as to what was said
or done at the time of the transaction. Hardship may
result in particular cases, but generally justice will more
fully prevail by reason of the rule."
And in In re Cunningham's Estate, 94 Wash. 191, 193, 161 Pac.
1193, it is said:
"The evident purpose of this statute is to prevent those
whom it covers from detailing any transaction with the deceased which it would be to the interests of the deceased if
living to deny. This purpose has been expressed thus:
death having closed the lips of one party, the law closes the
lips of the other."
In O'Connor v. Slatter, 48 Wash. 493, 495, 93 Pac. 1078, Judge
Rudkin, speaking for the Court, said:
"Death has sealed the lips of one of the parties and the
statute imposes the same silence upon the other. The prohibition of the statute is absolute and unconditional. It
admits of no qualification or exception, and it is not the
province of this Court to add to it or take from it."
One may not prove by indirection through his own testimony
that which the statute will not permit him to testify directly. Spencer
v. Terrel, 17 Wash. 514, 50 Pac. 468; O'Connor v. Slatter, 48
Wash. 493, 496, 93 Pac. 1078; Goldsworthy v. Oliver, 93 Wash.
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67, 69, 160 Pac. 4; Denis v. Metzenbaum, 124 Wash. 86, 213
Pac. 453.
The statute relates to the remedy, states a mere rule of evidence,
and does not affect or impair contractual rights or vested property
rights, so that it is constitutional, even though changed or amended
by the legislature after the commencement of the action. This
statute as it exists at the time of the trial, rather than at the time
of the commencement of the action, governs, and testimony within
its terms is excluded by it even though admissible under the statute
as it existed at the time of the transactions in question and at the
time of the commencement of the action. Smith v. Taylor, 2 Wash.
422, 425, 27 Pac. 812; Kenney Presbyterian Home v. Kenney, 45
Wash. 106, 110, 88 Pac. 108.
II.

ACTIONS IN WHICH THE RULE DOES NOT APPLY.

The bar of the statute does not apply in proceedings for the probate or contest of a will. In re Anderson's Estate, 114 Wash. 591,
594, 195 Pac. 994; In re Zelinsky's Estate, 130 Wash. 165, 166,
227 Pac. 507.
In In re Alfstad's Estate, 27 Wash. 175, 187, 67 Pac. 593, it
was held in effect that the inhibition of the statute does apply
as to testimony at the hearing on the final report of the administratrix.
III.

THE ADVERSE PARTY.

In an action against an administratrix, her testimony as to the
transaction with the deceased is admissible, because she is both the
witness and the administratrix, so that the same are not "adverse"
to each other, but are the same individual. The statute applies and
excludes the testimony only when the party who is adverse to the
witness on the stand, or to the party calling him and for whom he is
testifying, is suing or defending as executor, administrator or legal
representative, etc. The statute does not disqualify an interested
witness on behalf of the estate, but only one who is adverse to the
estate. O'Connor v. Slatter, 46 Wash. 308, 89 Pac. 85; In re Cunningham's Estate, 94 Wash. 191, 161 Pac. 1193; Brucker v. De
Hart, 106 Wash. 386, 391, 180 Pac. 397.
However, where the executor claims certain property in his individual capacity as grantee of the deceased in his lifetime, the
executor is barred by -the statute from testifying to the delivery of
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the deed by the deceased to him, since he is claiming adversely to the
state. In re Miller's Estate, 129 Wash. 211, 216, 224 Pac. 607.

IV.

EXECUTOR, ADMINISTRATOR, ETC.

The inhibition of the statute applies only in cases where at the
time of testifying the adverse party is suing or defending in one
of the enumerated capacities. Neis v. Farquharson, 9 Wash. 508,
515, 37 Pac. 697.
In an action by a beneficiary on a certificate of membership in
defendant mutual life insurance society after death of assured, defense being his false representations, the statute has no application,
since the insurance society is not defending as executor, administrator
or legal representative of the deceased assured, or as deriving right
or title through him. Erickson v. Modern Woodmen, 43 Wash.
242, 244, 86 Pac. 584.
Likewise, in an action against the city to recover damages for a
slide due to a regrade, plaintiff's testimony that a previous assignment by him of his right of action to one, since deceased, was not an
absolute assignment but merely as collateral security, is admissible,
as the statute has no application, since the defendant city was not an
executor, administrator or legal representative of the deceased, nor
one deriving right or title through him. Marks v. Seattle, 88 Wash.
61, 70, 152 Pac. 706.
In an action to recover attorneys' fees for services rendered for
the deceased, defendants being the trustees of his estate, based upon
their personal promise to pay the same, in consideration of the conveyance of certain property of the estate to them, the statutory proviso does not apply, since defendants were defending in their personal, rather than in their official capacity, and the fact that they
derived title through the estate of the deceased "does not change the
purpose and effect of the agreement here sued upon." Hart v. Bogle,
88 Wash. 125, 137, 152 Pac. 1010.
In an action against executors, testimony of plaintiffs as to agreements and arrangements between themselves and the deceased is
inadmissible since it comes within the terms of the proviso, and the
testimony was not admissible to establish a liability upon the part
of another living defendant, since the relief sought against him was
incidental to the principal object sought against the executors, especially since the court was not advised as to the restricted purpose for
which it was offered. Thorne v. Joy, 15 Wash. 83, 86, 45 Pac. 642.
In an action by a wife, individually and as executrix of the will
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of her deceased husband, to recover for personal injuries sustained
by herself, the husband having died three months after the wife's
injuries, his estate is sufficiently a party so that the statutory proviso applies where $150.00 damages to the community for medical
attendance and employment of others for housework is sought, and
to that extent the plaintiff is suing as executrix, although the gravamen of the demand is damages for continuing lifetime disabilities of
the widow individually. O'Toole v. Faulkner, 34 Wash. 371, 375,
75 Pac. 975.
V.

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE.

Where the plaintiff was cestui que trust of a resulting trust, the
trustee having been her deceased son, and the court in a previous
action had decreed the entire title to be in her, she is a legal representative of the deceased within the meaning of this statute. "Legal
representative" as therein used does not mean "personal representative." Smith v. Taylor, 2 Wash. 422, 425, 27 Pac. 812.
A mutual life insurance society is not a legal representative of the
deceased assured. Erickson v. Modern Woodmen, 43 Wash. 242,
244, 86 Pac. 584.
VI.

DERIVING RIGHT OR TITLE THROUGH THE DECEASED.

It was also held in Smith v. Taylor, supra (See V.), that the
case came within the statutory proviso because the plaintiff claimed
title by, through, or from the deceased.
The statute applies as against the plaintiff in an action by the
husband of the deceased to establish a resulting trust, the defendants
being heirs and children of the deceased by a former marriage, who
claim through her a one-half interest in the alleged community property. Spencer v. Terrel, 17 Wash. 514, 518, 50 Pac. 468.
Where the deceased husband by his will left all of the community
property to his wife "confidently leaving it to her to make . ...
provision for founding" a home for aged persons, and thereafter the
wife by will created a trust for the founding and maintenance of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff in an action to quiet title sues as "deriving
right or title by, through, or from" the deceased husband, so that
the bar of the statute applies and excludes testimony by defendant
that the land in question was purchased with partnership funds of
himself and the deceased husband. Kennev Presbyterian Home v.
Kenney, 45 Wash. 106, 110, 88 Pac. 108.
In an action to quiet title, defendants being a widower ana his
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children, where defendant and his wife before her death had executed and delivered a deed to plaintiff's grantor, but this deed was
later lost and defendant made affidavit stating the facts as to execution and delivery, the statute does not apply, and this affidavit is
admissible on behalf of the plaintiff, because the children do not
derive right or title through their deceased mother, since the affidavit
shows that she and her husband had conveyed all their title prior to
her death. Margett v. Wilson, 85 Wash. 98, 103, 147 Pac. 628.
In an action against trustees of the estate of a decedent to recover
for services rendered for the deceased, based on their personal promise
to pay therefor in consideration of the conveyance of certain property
of the estate to them, the statutory proviso does not apply, as the
fact that they derived title through the estate of the deceased "does
not change the purpose and effect of the agreement here sued upon."
Hart v. Bogle, 88 Wash. 125, 137, 152 Pac. 1010.
Where plaintiff sues on an Ohio judgment on a promissory note
as assignee of the administrator of the deceased payee, he sues as
deriving right or title through the deceased payee, so that defendant
may not testify as to an agreement between the payee and himself.
Cowen v. Gulp, 97 Wash. 480, 482, 166 Pac. 789.
VII.

GUARDIAN OF ESTATE OF INSANE PERSON OR MINOR.

Cases in which one of the parties sued or defended as guardian of
the estate of an insane person: Chlopeck v. Chlopeck, 47 Wash. 256,
258, 91 Pac. 966; Sanborn v. Dentler, 97 Wash. 149, 154, 166 Pac.
62; Blaser v. Meeker, 125 Wash. 379, 382, 216 Pac. 1.
Cases in which one of the parties sued or defended as guardian
of a minor under fourteen: Brown v. Davis, 98 Wash. 442, 445,
167 Pac. 1095 (shown by briefs, although not by the decision);
Spotts v. Westlake Garage Co., 116 Wash. 255, 258, 199 Pac. 294.
VIII. PARTY IN INTEREST.

It should be borne in mind that the statutory proviso applies and
the testimony is rendered admissible, only where the witness on the
stand is either a party in interest or a party to the record. It is
unnecessary that he be both, however.
A. IN GENERAL.

In an action by an administrator against a former administrator
of the same estate to recover for the misappropriation of assets of
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the estate, defendant's brother, a son and heir of the deceased, is not
a party in interest, since the estate would not be diminished by a
personal judgment against the defendant. Dictum that he would be
a party in interest if the estate would be thus diminished. McCoy v.
Ayers, 2 Wash. Terr. 307, 312.
In an action against executor of deceased payee to recover possession of a promissory note, plaintiff, the maker, is a party in interest.
Carr v. Jones, 29 Wash. 78, 83, 69 Pac. 646.
In an action for personal injury sustained in a collision of a wagon
with defendant's street car, defendant's motorman, who was not
joined as a party defendant, is not a party in interest, since he cannot
be bound by the result of the suit and would have an opportunity
to prove lack of negligence on his part before his employer could
obtain reimbursement from him in any subsequent action. The interest which disqualifies a -witness is an interest in the event of the
action, and the true test of interest is that the record will be legal
evidence against the witness in another action, which would not be
true as to this motorman.
"If the interest is of a doubtful nature, the objection goes
to the credibility of the witness and not to his competency."
O'Toole v. Faulkner, 34 Wash. 371, 375, 75 Pac. 975.
For similar holding on similar facts, to the effect that defendant's conductor in charge of clearing a landslide, who was not made
a party of record, is not a party in interest, see Slavens v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C. A.), 97 Fed. 255, 261.
Court quotes with approval from Greenleaf:
"The true test of the interest of a witness is that he will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect
of the judgment, or that the record will be legal evidence
for or against him in some other action. It must be a
present, certain and vested interest, and not an interest uncertain, remote, or contingent." In re Sloan's Estate, 50
Wash. 86, 90, 96 Pac. 684, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 960.
In an action to recover land, plaintiff's attorney is not a party in
interest where he testified that he had made no arrangements with
his client concerning his fees, that there was no agreement for a
contingent fee or for any interest in the property recovered, and that
he would charge a reasonable fee, although he would charge more
if successful than if unsuccessful. Dictum that where, however, it
is previously agreed that the attorney is to receive an interest in
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whatever may be recovered or is to be compensated only in the event
of success, the attorney is a party in interest.
"The disqualifying interest must be a direct and immediate interest in the event of the action, and not an
uncertain, remote and contingent interest. The relationship of the witness to the action must be such that he will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect
of the judgment." Swingley v. Daniels, 123 Wash. 409,
413, 212 Pac. 729.
It was held that the witness was not a party in interest or to the
record in Richardson v. Agnew, 46 Wash. 117, 120, 89 Pac. 404,
and Plath v. Mullins, 87 Wash. 403, 151 Pac. 811.
B. JOINT

OWNER OR HEIR OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY OR SEPARATE
PROPERTY.

In an action to recover for the benefit of the community, such as
for the husband's personal services in the community business, his
wife is a party in interest, since the amount recovered will be community property in which she is equally interested with the husband.
Whitney v. Priest, 26 Wash. 48, 49, 66 Pac. 108.
Likewise in an action by a son of the deceased to enforce an alleged
oral contract of the father to give plaintiff by will all his property in
consideration of care and support, the plaintiff's wife is a party in
interest whose testimony as to the contract is inadmissible, since the
recovery would be community property because acquired during
marriage by contract rather than by gift or devise. Andrews v. Andrews, 116 Wash. 513, 517, 199 Pac. 981.
However, in an action to recover plaintiff's separate propertv,
plaintiff's son and heir apparent is not a party in interest, because his
only interest is that of a prospective heir, the rule being that the
living have no heirs and that the interest of the ancestor does not
disqualify the heir apparent. In re Sloan's Estate, 50 Wash. 86, 90,
96 Pac. 684, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 960.
Accordingly in an action to quiet title against husband and wife
who claim separate and distinct properties conveyed by the deceased
to each of them by separate deeds of gift as the separate property of
the grantee spouse in each instance, each spouse may testify in behalf
of the other (although not in his own behalf), since the witness has
no vested interest in the separate property of the other spouse. Showaiter v. Spangle, 93 Wash. 326, 330, 160 Pac. 1042.
Dictum in Meyer v. Campion, 120 Wash. 457, 471, 207 Pac. 670,
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that the wife is not a disinterested party as to the separate property
of the husband, but the Court was there referring to the credibility
rather than competency of her testimony. Trial court there followed
the rule of the Showalter case, and Court evidently did not consider
this erroneous
Husband is not a party in interest testifying in his own behalf,
in action to recover separate property of the wife. Griffin v. Lear,
123 Wash. 191, 202, 212 Pac. 271.
C.

STOCKHOLDER OF CORPORATION.

In an action of unlawful detainer, H. W. Baker, president and
one of the stockholders of defendant corporation, is a party in interest, whose testimony in behalf of the corporation as to an oral
agreement with deceased lessor reducing the rent is inadmissible,
where the conversation in question occurred prior to the organization of the defendant corporation at a time when the witness was
carrying on the business in his individual capacity, since he at the
time of the transaction was the real party in interest and was representing himself. Gilmore v. H. W. Baker Co., 12 Wash. 468, 471,
41 Pac. 124.
In an action against executor of deceased payee to recover possession of a promissory note given by plaintiff individually to cover the
excess of liabilities over assets at time of sale to the deceased of the
assets of a banking corporation of which plaintiff was a stockholder
and director, plaintiff is a party in interest whose testimony as to
transactions and conversations with the deceased is inadmissible; but
other stockholders and directors of the bank are-not parties in interest where, although interested to see that the sale was made, they
assumed no liability on the note and where no claim for contribution
could arise against them in favor of the plaintiff. Carr v. Jones, 29
Wash. 78, 83, 69 Pac. 646.
A stockholder and officer of a corporation is a party in interest
where the corporation is one of the interested parties (lessee), and
his testimony in behalf of the corporation as to an agreement with
deceased lessor reducing the rent is inadmissible. Conlan v. Spokane
Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378, 381, 201 Pac. 26.
D. AsSIGNOR.
One cannot evade the statute or cease to be a party in interest by
assigning his interest in the subject-matter, such as by assigning a
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lease under which he was lessee, to a corporation which he had organized and of which he is president and a stockholder. Gilmore v. H.
W. Baker Co., 12 Wash. 468, 471, 41 Pac. 124.
However the original lessee who with consent of the lessor has
assigned the lease to a corporation in which he has no interest or connection, is not a party in interest, and his testimony in behalf of the
assignee is admissible. Spotts v. Westlake Garage Go., 116 Wash.
255, 258, 199 Pac. 294.
An assignor who still retains an interest in the subject-matter assigned is a party in interest. Shaw v. Lobe, 58 Wash. 219, 221, 108
Pac. 450, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 333.
However an assignor for value who retains no interest in the subject-matter, so that he neither gains nor loses as a result of the suit, is
not a party in interest and may testify as to his transactions with the
deceased debtor. Dictum that if the witness were to be liable over to
the assignee in case of nonrecovery, he would be a party in interest.
Olsen v. Kemoe, 32 Wash. Dec. 216, 231 Pac. 778.
E.

EFFECT OF DISCLAIMER.

In an action against executors to have a real estate mortgage cancelled, a witness is a party in interest who bad conveyed his interest
in the land to a bank and retained a right to redeem upon payment of
amount due to his grantee, so that the conveyance was in fact a mortgage, even though he later released his right to redeem. Thorne v.
Joy, 15 Wash. 83, 85, 45 Pac. 642.
In an action to quiet title, a wife, not a party to the record, through
whom both parties claim title, who files a sworn disclaimer of any
interest in the property, is not a party in interest, and the defendant
cannot disqualify her as a witness by an allegation in his cross complaint that she claims an interest therein. Denny v. Schwabacher,
54 Wash. 689, 694, 104 Pac. 137, 132 Am. St. Rep. 1140.
However, in an action to require the satisfaction of a mortgage
and trust deed on the ground of payment of the note secured thereby,
a witness who was made an additional defendant by defendant's
cross complaint and who was one of the parties signing the note,
mortgage and trust deed, and one of the appellants, is a party in
interest even though his attorney in open court disclaims all interest
in the case on his part. Lee v. Northwest Trust and Savings Bank,
128 Wash. 214, 215, 222 Pac. 489.
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IX.

SHALL NOT BE ADMITTED TO TESTIFY.

The statute excludes testimony under such circumstances by
answers to written interrogatories, as well as oral testimony. Moore
v. Palmer, 14 Wash. 134, 136, 44 Pac. 142.
As to depositions, see XIV, infra.
X.

IN

His OwN

BEHALF.

A party in interest may testify, but not in his own behalf. One
not a party to the record is not testifying in his own behalf when
he merely testifies to a state of affairs that may collaterally or remotely affect his interest. Where one's interest is not bound by the
judgment in the particular proceeding in which he testifies, he cannot be said to be testifying in his own behalf. A widow, mortgagor,
may testify in behalf of defendant, the mortgage foreclosure sale
purchaser, that the property in question was her separate property
iather than community property of herself and her deceased husband through whom the plaintiffs, his illegitimate children, claim
title, since she was not testifying in her own behalf. Sackman v.
Thomas, 24 Wash. 660, 672, 64 Pac. 819; O'Toole v. Faulkner, 34
Wash. 371, 375, 75 Pac. 975.
An affidavit of defendant stating the facts as to his execution
and delivery to plaintiff's grantor of a lost deed is admissible in
behalf of the plaintiff as a declaration against interest on the part of
the defendant and is not testimony of the defendant in his own
behalf. Margett v. Wilson, 85 Wash. 98, 103, 147 Pac. 628.
In an action to quiet title against husband and wife, each of
whom claims as his separate property distinct properties through
separate deeds of gift from the deceased, neither spouse is competent
to testify in his own behalf, but each may testify in behalf of the
other as to delivery of the deed by the deceased. Showalter v.
Spangle, 93 Wash. 326, 330, 160 Pac. 1042; (also Meyer v. Campion, 120 Wash. 457, 471, 207 Pac. 670.)
XI.

SUBJECT -MATTER OF TESTIMONY

EXCLUDED;

TRANSACTIONS WITH THE DECEASED.

A. IN

GENERAL.

The statute does not disqualify a party in interest or party to the
record as a witness, does not extend to every fact to which the deceased might testify if living, and excludes nothing except testimony
concerning transactions had by the witness with or statement made
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by the deceased or incompetent person. Moore v. Palmer, 14 Wash.
134, 136, 44 Pac. 142; Kauffman v. Baillie, 46 Wash. 248, 251, 89
Pac. 548; O'Connor v. Slatter, 48 Wash. 493, 496, 93 Pac. 1078;
Engstrom v. Peterson, 107 Wash. 523, 527, 182 Pac. 623.
In an action to recover for personal services rendered for the deceased, plaintiff's testimony as to the time, place and nature of his
work is admissible, as it relates solely to acts of the witness and does
not relate to a transaction had by him with the deceased. For the
same reason plaintiff's account book showing the services rendered is
admissible. Ah How v. Furth, 13 Wash. 550, 553, 43 Pac. 639; Sanborn v. Dentler, 97 Wash. 149, 154, 166 Pac. 62; Slavin v. Ackman, 119 Wash. 48, 50, 204 Pac. 816.
Defendant's testimony as to a transaction between himself and one
of the living plaintiffs is admissible although another one of the
plaintiffs is deceased at time of trial, as there was no attempt to
prove any transaction had with the deceased. Rauh v. Scholl, 19
Wash. 30, 31, 52 Pac. 332.
Testimony of the plaintiff in an action to recover his share of
profits made in real estate investments by the deceased and himself,
that he looked at certain lots when he was alone, stating the time
when he saw them, their value, and that deeds were afterwards
made for the property, is admissible, as nothing was said about transactions or conversations with the deceased. Marvin v. Yates, 26
Wash. 50, 57, 66 Pac. 131.
In an action to establish a one-third interest in real property of
the deceased, plaintiff did not violate the statute where his testimony
related only to transactions between himself and a third party, all of
which occurred in the absence of the decedent, for the purpose of
showing the services performed by the plaintiff in securing and purchasing the property. Kauffman v. Baillie, 46 Wash. 248, 251, 89
Pac. 548.
Testimony by the plaintiff as to whether or not defendant was
present at the time the notes in suit were indorsed by the deceased
is competent, since it is not testimony as to a transaction had by the
plaintiff with the deceased. O'Connor v. Slatter, 48 Wash. 493,
496, 93 Pac. 1078.
In an action to enjoin removal of timber sold by the plaintiff to
one, since deceased, who sold to defendant, plaintiff's testimony as
to the transaction whereby he sold to the decedent, is incompetent.
Preston v. Hill-Wilson Shingle Co., 50 Wash. 377, 380, 97 Pac.
293.
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Defendant's testimony as to transactions and conversations bet-ween himself and the grantee in a certain deed, through whom
plaintiff claims title, are inadmissible, where the evidence, although
conflicting, is sufficient to establish the death of said grantee. Wash.
Safe Deposit Co. v. Lietzow, 59 Wash. 281, 283, 109 Pac. 1021.
In an action by administrator of deceased vendee against vendor
for specific performance, defendant's testimony that the deceased had
forfeited the contract is inadmissible. Shorett v. Knudsen, 74 Wash.
448, 450, 133 Pac. 1029.
Testimony by the husband and son of the deceased that certain
property was a gift by them respectively to the deceased, without consideration, and that no community property entered into the transaction, so that the same was the separate property of the deceased, is
competent, as it does not relate to a transaction with the deceased.
In re Cunningham's Estate, 94 Wash. 191, 161 Pac. 1193.
Plaintiff's testimony that, acting as agent for the benefit of the
deceased, he made certain payments to third parties with her moneys
which he had collected, is competent, as it is not testimony as to
any transaction had by him with the deceased. Floe v. Anderson,
124 Wash. 438, 439, 214 Pac. 827.
In an action on a promissory note, defense being an agreement
with plaintiff's insane ward that the balance due thereon should be
cancelled in consideration of defendant's services rendered, defendant may not testify that the ward hired him to work for her, or as
to any agreement between them. Blaser v. Meeker, 125 Wash. 379,
382, 216 Pac. 1.
Payment of a debt or promissory note to the payee since deceased is a transaction had with the deceased, and testimony thereto
is incompetent within the inhibition of the statute. Goldsworthy v.
Oliver, 93 Wash. 67, 69, 160 Pac. 4; Lee v. Northwest Tr. and S.
Bank, 128 Wash. 214, 215, 222 Pac. 489.
B. ExECUTION, DELIVERY

AND

ALTERATION OF DEEDS, NOTES

AND

OTHER WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS.

In an action on a promissory note brought by the administratrix
of the deceased payee, defendants may not testify that there was an
alteration as to time of payment after the execution of the note,
since this is testimony as to a transaction with the deceased. Wolferman v. Bell, 6 Wash. 84, 85, 32 Pac. 1017, 36 Am. St. Rep. 126.
In an action against executors, plaintiff's testimony that the de-
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ceased put him in possession under an agreement for a deed and that
the deed was delivered to him by the deceased but contained an
erroneous description, is inadmissible, as it relates to a transaction
had with the deceased; and this testimony should have been stricken
even though the details of the transaction were brought out on
cross-examination of the plaintiff, since the answers of the witness
on direct examination, when explained, could not mean anything
other than the transaction with the deceased. Kline v. Stein, 30
Wash. 189, 193, 70 Pac. 235.
Testimony by an endorser that the words "demand and notice
waived" were not on a promissory note at the time of its endorsement to a person since deceased is incompetent as it relates to a
transaction had by the endorser with the deceased. A maker or
endorser may not testify after the death of the payee or endorser
that the note was altered after execution and delivery or endorsement.

Bay View Brewing Company v. Grubb, 31 Wash. 34, 37,

71 Pac. 553.
Testimony of the plaintiff is incompetent which is directed to the
explanation of the conditions of a bond for a deed and other writings
as between the witness and the deceased. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 42
Wash. 107, 112, 84 Pac. 579.
Testimony by the plaintiff as to whether or not defendant was
present at the time the notes in suit were endorsed by the decedent
is competent, since it is not testimony as to a transaction had by the
plaintiff with the deceased. However, testimony by the plaintiff as
to whether or not the notes had been changed since he received them
from the deceased grantor is incompetent, since it is an indirect way
of asking what their condition was when received from the deceased,
and therefore relates to a transaction had by the witness with him.
O'Connor v. Slatter, 48 Wash. 493, 496, 93 Pac. 1078.
Where the question is whether certain deeds executed by the deceased were delivered, the grantee may testify that he had the deeds
in his possession very soon after the date thereof and thereafter continuously retained the same in his possession, as this is not testimony
as to any transaction had by him with the deceased grantor. Bardsley v. Truax, 64 Wash. 400, 402, 116 Pac. 1075.
However, the grantee may not testify directly as to the delivery or
receipt of such deed. White v. Walker, 84 Wash. 652, 147 Pac.
409; Showalter v. Spangle, 93 Wash. 326, 330, 160 Pac. 1042.
Testimony of the defendant identifying the signature of the deceased on receipts, which purported to have been given by deceased
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to defendant, is competent, since such identification is not a transaction with the deceased or a statement made by him, and the receipt
itself if in existence would be evidence of the fact that it was given.
However, testimony that a certain receipt was given to defendant
by the deceased or was in existence, but is lost and is not introduced
as evidence, is incompetent, since the giving of the receipt was clearly
a transaction with the deceased. Goldsworthy v. Oliver, 93 Wash.
67, 69, 160 Pac. 4.
Preparatory to proving the gift of certain stock from her husband,
since deceased, a widow may testify that a written instrument evidencing the gift delivered to her by the husband contemporaneously
with the delivery of the stock has since been lost, where this is
offered not to prove the receipt or contents of the instrument but
merely to show the loss thereof, thus laying the foundation for
secondary evidence of its contents by another witness. In re Bushnell's Estate, 107 Wash. 331, 335, 182 Pac. 89.
Defendant's testimony that an interlineation adding the name of
his wife after his name as grantee in a deed was not in the deed at
the time of its execution and delivery, is competent, as it does not
relate to "a transaction had by him with the deceased," since she
was not present at the time the deed was executed, and if living
could not have testified as to the condition of the deed at that time.
Engstrom v. Peterson, 107 Wash. 523, 527, 182 Pac. 623.
Trial court permitted plaintiff to testify he had received a letter
from his mother, since deceased, which was lost, but did not permit
him to testify as to its contents; point not discussed. Sturgis v. McElroy, 113 Wash. 192, 195, 193 Pac. 719.
One may testify that she received a certain letter, introduced in
evidence, from a person since deceased and that she performed the
acts therein mentioned for the benefit of the sender of the letter by
coming and taking care of her. Slavin v. Ackman, 119 Wash. 48,
50, 204 Pac. 816.
In an action against an executor to enforce claims against the
estate, plaintiff contending that he had been induced by fraud of the
deceased to endorse to him the notes given as the purchase price of
mining claims in which they were interested, plaintiff may testify
only to the surrounding circumstances, the fact that he endorsed
the notes to the deceased, and the mutual execution of the writing
entered into by them at that time. Arneson v. Copeman, 119 Wash.
659, 661, 206 Pac. 355.
In an action to obtain title to land deeded by plaintiff to the

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
deceased in consideration of his devising same to plaintiff, where
decedent made such will at the time of the delivery of the deed
but later revoked it and executed a will in defendants' favor, plaintiff may testify that the deceased executed the first will, that he saw
the deeds by himself to the deceased in company with such will, and
that the carbon copy introduced in evidence is a true copy of the first
will executed by the deceased, since such testimony does not relate to
a transaction had by him with the deceased. Swingley v. Daniels,
123 Wash. 409, 413, 212 Pac. 729.
In an action by executrix of deceased payee on a promissory
note, one of the defendants may not testify that he signed, at a time
when the payee was not present, as a mere accommodation maker at
the request of the other maker, since the execution and delivery of
the note is a transaction with the payee, and the payee if alive could
have testified to whom he loaned the money, even though he could
not have testified as to conversations between the two makers in his
absence. Denis v. Metzenbaum, 124 Wash. 86, 213 Pac. 453.
Testimony as to an arrangement with a person since deceased
whereby a deed executed by her was deposited in escrow to be
delivered to the witness upon the death of the grantor is incompetent, as it relates to a transaction had by him with the deceased.
In re Miller's Estate, 129 Wash. 211, 216, 224 Pac. 607.
C.

AGREEMENT WITH THE DECEASED.

An oral agreement with a person since deceased is a transaction,
so that testimony as to such agreement is within the inhibition of the
statute. Gilmore v. H. W. Baker Co., 12 Wash. 468, 471, 41
Pac. 124; Thorne v. Joy, 15 Wash. 83, 86, 45 Pac. 642; Cowen v.
Gulp, 97 Wash. 480, 482, 166 Pac. 789; Velikanje v. Dickman, 98
Wash. 584, 593, 168 Pac. 465; Andrews v. Andrews, 116 Wash.
513, 517, 199 Pac. 981; Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co., 117
Wash. 378, 381, 201 Pac. 26; Blaser v. Meeker, 125 Wash. 379,
382, 216 Pac. 1; In re Miller's Estate, 129 Wash. 211, 216, 224
Pac. 607; Perkins v. Allen, 33 Wash. Dec. 297, 300, 234 Pac. 25.
D. EXISTENCE OF PARTNERSHIP WITH THE DECEASED.
Testimony to prove the existence of a partnership with the deceased is inadmissible, as it relates to a transaction had with the
deceased. In re Alfstad's Estate, 27 Wash. 175, 187, 67 Pac. 593;
Kenney Presbyterian Home v. Kenney, 45 Wash, 106, 110, 88
Pac. 108; Chlopeck v. Chlopeck, 47 Wash. 256, 258, 91 Pac. 9 6 6 ;
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Shaw v. Lobe, 58 Wash. 219, 221, 108 Pac. 450, 29 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 333; Kelly v. Moss, 120 Wash, 1, 2, 206 Pac. 941.
Likewise testimony as to transactions with the deceased to prove
there was no partnership is inadmissible. In re Krilich's Estate, 122
Wash. 306, 311, 210 Pac. 788, 215 Pac. 9.
E.

TRANSACTIONS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A PARTNERSHIP OR CORPORATION.

The statute excludes testimony as to transactions with a partner
since deceased who was acting as the representative of his partnership, where the surviving partner has no personal knowledge of the
transaction. Accordingly, an endorser of a promissory note to a
partnership may not testify that there was an alteration by adding
the words "demand and notice waived" subsequent to his endorsement and delivery of the note, after the death of the partner with
whom the transaction was had, the surviving partner being ignorant
thereof. Bay View Brewing Co. v. Grubb, 31 Wash. 34, 37, 71
Pac. 553.
However, the statute does not exclude testimony as to a transaction had with a corporation through its agent, officer and stockholder, since deceased. Dictum that
"our statute applies, in its terms, only in the case of the
death of a natural person who is a principal in the contract," and "makes no reference to corporations, or to
agents of corporations, or even to agents of deceased natural
persons."
Beaston v. Portland Trust & Savings Bank, 89 Wash. 627, 630,
155 Pac. 162, Ann. Cas. 1917-B 488; Northern Bank and Trust
Company v. Harmon, 126 Wash. 25, 27, 217 Pac. 8.

F.

MARRIAGE WITH THE DECEASED.

In an action to quiet title, the issue being whether plaintiff and
defendant's deceased mother were ever lawfully married, plaintiff
may not testify that he and the deceased were never married to each
other, since this relates to a transaction with the deceased. Nelson v.
Carlson, 48 Wash. 651, 653, 94 Pac. 477.
Likewise plaintiff may not testify to the marriage of herself and
the deceased. Weatherall v. Weatherall, 56 Wash. 344, 352, 105
Pac. 822.
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G.

RESULTING TRUSTS.

A party in interest or to the record may not testify that he paid
the purchase price of property, title of which was taken in the name
of the deceased, so that the deceased held title as trustee of a resulting trust, nor may he testify in his own behalf to prove any
fact tending to establish a resulting trust, as this relates to a transaction had by him with the deceased. Spencer v. Terrel, 17 Wash.
514, 518, 50 Pac. 468; Smith v. Scott, 51 Wash. 330, 331, 98 Pac.
763; Weatherall v. Weatherall, 56 Wash. 344, 352, 105 Pac. 822;
Brucker v. De Hart, 106 Wash, 386, 390, 180 Pac. 397.
H. ACCOUNT BOOKS.
In an action to recover for services rendered for the deceased, an
account book kept by plaintiff showing the time, amount and nature
of his services, is admissible, as it relates solely to acts of the witness
and not to a transaction had by him with the deceased. Ah How v.
Furth, 13 Wash. 550, 553, 43 Pac. 639; Sanborn v. Dentler, 97
Wash. 149, 154, 166 Pac. 62.
Plaintiff may not, in proving that the deceased held certain property as trustee of a resulting trust, explain her method of bookkeeping to the effect that certain entries represented payments made by
the witness to the deceased to be applied on the purchase price of the
property. Smith v. Scott, 51 Wash. 330, 331, 98 Pac. 763.
In an action against executrix of deceased alleged partner for an
accounting, the surviving partner may not explain the partnership
books kept by him, as this relates to transactions had by him with
the deceased. Shaw v. Lobe, 58 Wash. 219, 221, 108 Pac. 450, 29
L. R. A. (N. S.) 333.
In an action against an administrator to recover upon an account
for money advanced and for services rendered as bookkeeper for the
deceased, the journal kept by plaintiff for the deceased which, among
other items apparently made in the usual course of business, at varying intervals, contained entries as to cash and labor charges in plaintiff's favor, some of which represented money advanced by plaintiff
to the deceased, is admissible, since it is the book of the principal and
admissible against him or his estate. Robertson v. O'Neill, 67 Wash.
121, 122, 120 Pac. 884.
In an action by executors against an alleged debtor of the deceased,
defense being payment, defendant's account book containing no other
account, showing entries of various alleged payments to the deceased
over a period of three years, is inadmissible. The payments of these
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amounts to the deceased were transactions had with him, and may
not be proved by defendant's testimony either directly or by indirection through the means of an account book. The rule of Ah How
v. Furth ought not to be further extended. Goldsworthy v. Oliver,
93 Wash. 67, 69, 160 Pac. 4.
In an action on a promissory note brought by the executor of the
deceased payee against the executrix of the deceased maker, the
issue being as to payment, the ledger account kept by the deceased
payee containing the original entries of this transaction, is admissible, in view of the testimony of the plaintiff executor, who has no
further interest in the action (proviso to the proviso), that the account had been shown to the maker of the note before his death,
who then admitted it was correct. Burnham v. Rowley, 111 Wash.
656, 658, 191 Pac. 811.
In an action by executrix on a promissory note and for money
received, defendant's testimony identifying the books of account pertaining to the mercantile business conducted by defendant and the
deceased as partners, and stating that said books were kept by defendant and his wife, is competent, and the books themselves are
admissible. McDonald v. McDonald, 119 Wash. 396, 403, 206
Pac. 23.
XII.

SUBJECT MATTER OF TESTIMONY EXCLUDED:

STATEMENTS

MADE BY THE DECEASED.

In an action by administratrix to recover money paid by the
deceased upon a settlement, objection was properly sustained to
question propounded to defendant, "State what transpired at the
time of the settlement and all you remember about it," since the
question was general and called for everything that transpired at
that time and included statements made by the deceased. Moylan v.
Moylan, 49 Wash. 341, 344, 95 Pac. 271.
In an action to quiet title, the question being whether a deed
in form was in fact a deed absolute or a mortgage, defendant may
not testify as to statements made to her by her deceased husband to
the effect that it was a mortgage. The rule of res gestae does not
apply to the extent of overcoming the statute and rendering evidence
competent which is incompetent under the statute. Dempsey v.
Dempsey, 61 Wash. 632, 635, 112 Pac. 755.
In an action on an open account against an administrator, testimony of the plaintiff that the deceased had checked over his account
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and said that he approved it and that it was correct, is inadmissible.
Robertson v. O'Neill, 67 Wash. 121, 123, 120 Pac. 884.
The statute excludes testimony not only as to statements made by
the deceased to the interested witness but also testimony as to statements made by him to a third party in the presence of the witness,
"under the doctrine of necessary implication." Nicholson v. Kilbury,
80 Wash. 500, 141 Pac. 1043.
Testimony that in entering into an agreement the witness relied
upon the alleged fraudulent statements and representations of the
deceased is admissible, where the witness does not herself testify
what the statements were. Normile v. Denison, 116 Wash. 452,
456, 199 Pac. 995; O'Connor v. Slatter, 46 Wash. 308, 89 Pac.
885.
Testimony as to statements made by the decedent was also held
inadmissible in Kalinowski v. MeNeny, 68 Wash. 681, 682, 123 Pac.
1074, and Wilson v. Joseph, 101 Wash. 614, 616, 172 Pac. 745.
Testimony by an interested party as to an oral agreement with the
deceased is inadmissible; see cases cited, XI. C., supra.
XIII. THE PROVISO TO THE PROVISO.
The defendant, widow of the deceased, may not testify as to
transactions with or statements by her deceased husband, as she does
not come within the proviso to the proviso, since, although defending
in a fiduciary capacity as the guardian of her minor child, under
fourteen, she has a further interest in the action, inasmuch as she
is claiming a one-half interest in the alleged community property.
Brown v. Davis, 98 Wash. 442, 445, 167 Pac. 1095.
An executor who claims property adversely to the estate as his
individual property by deed from the deceased does not come within
the proviso to the proviso, since he has a personal interest in the
action. In re Miller's Estate, 129 Wash. 211, 216, 224 Pac. 607.
Where the plaintiff is an executor of a decedent's estate and has
no personal interest in the action, his testimony as to statements
made to him by the defendant's testator, is admissible, under the
proviso to the proviso. (Court does not discuss). Burnham v.
Rowley, 111 Wash. 656, 658, 191 Pac. 811.
In a probate proceeding, the mother by adoption of an adopted
grandchild of the deceased not mentioned in the will, who petitions
as guardian in behalf of the infant that he be awarded his share of
the estate as though the deceased had died intestate, and who has no
further interest in the action, "was not an incompetent witness,"
under the statute, and was properly permitted to testify that the tes-
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tator knew and approved of the adoption of the child by his son.
Chaffee v. Morris (decided May 13, 1925), 34 Wash. Dec. 260,
264.
XIV. THE RULE AS TO DEPOSITIONS.

Where one of the defendants died and his administrators were
substituted as parties, subsequent to the taking of the deposition of
one of the plaintiffs but before trial, the plaintiff's deposition is admissible, since the rule of the statute is to be applied as of the time
of testifying, that is, the time of taking the deposition (at which time
all of the adverse parties were living), rather than the time of trial
and its introduction in court. If the witness and his testimony are
competent at the time the deposition is taken, the prohibition of the
statute does not apply although after the taking of the deposition
and before trial one of the adverse parties dies. Neis v. Farquharson, 9 Wash. 508, 515, 37 Pac. 697; Beaston v. Portland Trust &
Savings Bank, 89 Wash. 627, 630, 155 Pac. 162, Ann. Cas. 1917-B
488.
XV.

RELATION TO OTHER RULES OF EVIDENCE.

The mere fact that otherwise the testimony would be admissible
as part of the res gestae does not cause it to be admissible if it is
excluded by the proviso of this statute. Dempsey v. Dempsey, 61
Wash. 632, 635, 112 Pac. 755.
The statute does not change the general rule that self-serving
declarations made out of the presence of the other party are inadmissible. The deceased if living could not testify to self-serving declarations made to third parties, nor may his representatives prove such
declarations even though they are not excluded by this statute.
O'Connor v. Slatter, 46 Wash. 308, 89 Pac. 885; Goldsworthy v.
Oliver, 93 Wash. 67, 69, 160 Pac. 4.
XVI.

SPECIFIC AND TIMELY OBJECTION SHOULD BE MADE.

Objection under this section should be specifically on the grounds
therein set forth and not merely a general objection that the testimony is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. Sackman v.
Thomas, 24 Wash. 660, 686, 64 Pac. 819.
In an action to quiet title, where testimony was admitted on behalf
of the plaintiff without objection, the witness was rigidly cross-examined on the subject-matter of his testimony and was not examined as to his personal interest, and several days later a motion was
made to strike his testimony under this statute on the ground that
the witness had conveyed to plaintiff's predecessor in title by warranty deed, the motion to strike was properly denied inasmuch as the
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question was not raised timely and the witness might have had some
explanation of his apparent interest by reason of his warranty. Newman v. Buzard, 24 Wash. 225, 228, 64 Pac. 139.
In an action tried de novo on appeal, the Supreme Court will
disregard testimony incompetent under the statute although not objected to in the lower court. Wolferman v. Bell, 6 Wash. 84, 85,
32 Pac. 1017, 36 Am. St. Rep. 126.
In cases tried de novo on appeal, the Supreme Court will not
order a reversal and new trial for error in the admission of evidence
under this statute, but will merely disregard the evidence erroneously
admitted. Johnson v. Clark, 120 Wash. 25, 29, 206 Pac. 914.
It may be noted that the court commented favorably on the fact
that counsel cautioned the witness not to testify as to any transactions
had by him with or statements made by the deceased, in Marvin v.
Yates, 26 Wash. 50, 57, 66 Pac. 131, and Kauffman v. Baillie, 46
Wash. 248, 251, 89 Pac. 548.

XVII. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO OBJECT.
In an action on a promissory note against the administratrix of
the deceased guarantor, the administratrix by testifying fully as to
the transaction does not in any way waive her right to object to
testimony by plaintiffs as to transactions had with her deceased husband. O'Connor v. Slatter, 48 Wash. 493, 495, 93 Pac. 1078.
In an action on an open account against an administrator to
recover for money advanced and services rendered to the deceased,
error in the admission of plaintiff's testimony that the deceased
checked over his account and said it was correct, is waived where
after reserving his exception to the evidence, defendant cross-examined the plaintiff touching a number of items in the account, had
him identify the checks of the deceased issued to the plaintiff, and
had him admit that he received and cashed them. Also where defendant later called plaintiff as a witness and had him identify the
signatures to certain exhibits, including checks drawn in plaintiff's
favor by the deceased, and the court permitted plaintiff to explain
why the checks were drawn in his favor and to state that he gave
the money which they represented to the deceased, the defendant has
waived his right to object thereto. The law will not permit the
representative of a deceased person to use the adverse party to the
extent that it might aid him and then claim the benefit of the statute
when the adverse party seeks to qualify or explain his testimony.
A like rule applies where the cross-examination is extended beyond
the scope of what the witness would have been permitted to testify
in chief upon direct examination. "He who invokes the protection
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of the statute must himself respect it." Robertson v. O'Neill, 67
Wash. 121, 123, 120 Pac. 884.
In an action by an administrator to recover property of the estate,
the administrator does not waive his right to object to incompetent
testimony of the defendant by previously bringing an iriquisitorial
proceeding under Rem. Comp. Stat., Sec. 1472 (Laws '17, p. 670,
chap. 156) before the probate court to ascertain the property left
by the deceased and examining the witness at that proceeding.
Dictum that if the administrator had offered in evidence the answers
given by the witness at the previous hearing, she could have testified
to any fact therein referred to and possibly to the entire transaction.
Percy v. Miller, 115 Wash. 440, 443, 197 Pac. 638.
In an action by administrators to recover property of the estate,
where plaintiffs called a court reporter and introduced part of
defendant's testimony at a former trial in the probate proceeding,
to prove contradictory statements and admissions, defendant on crossexamination may introduce the complete transcript of his testimony
at the former trial, and the plaintiffs have waived their right to
object thereto. Levy v. Simon, 119 Wash. 179, 186, 205 Pac. 426.
In an action against an administrator to establish a claim against
the estate, the court properly overruled an objection to testimony
of the plaintiff that part of the money in a payment to him by the
deceased was a mere repayment of his own money, where this testimony was brought out on cross-examination of plaintiff by defendant's attorney, since a representative may not examine the opposing
party on matters to which he would otherwise be incompetent to
testify and accept his testimony insofar as it aids him and reject it
insofar as it is adverse to him. Johnson v. Clark, 120 Wash. 25,
29, 206 Pac. 914.
In an action by an administratrix against the attorney of the
deceased to establish a trust in real property and for an accounting,
where defendant is called as a witness for plaintiff but is not examined as to any transaction had by him with, or any statement
made to him by the deceased, the plaintiff does not waive the benefit
of the statute, and on cross-examination the defendant may not testify
as to transactions and conversations with the deceased. (Judges
Fullerton and Mitchell dissenting). Conner v. Hodgdon, 120 Wash.
426, 433, 207 Pac. 675.
Where defendant executor calls plaintiff as a witness and has him
testify that he had collected certain funds as agent for the deceased,
plaintiff on cross-examination may testify that he made certain payments with said funds to third parties as agent for the benefit of the
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deceased, since defendant has waived the right to object thereto.
Floe v. Anderson, 124 Wash. 438, 440, 214 Pac. 827.
XVIII.

CONCLvSION.

To summarize briefly, it is evident that a particular case comes
within the proviso to the proviso, and therefore the evidence is admissible, where the two following essential requirements concur:
1. The witness must be a party of record, and must be suing or
defending in a representative or fiduciary capacity; and
2. He must have no other or further interest in the action.
Unless a particular case comes within the proviso to the proviso,
it comes within the proviso, and therefore the testimony is inadmissible, when, and only when, the three following essential requirements concur:
1. The party adverse to the witness, or adverse to the party calling
him, and for whom he testifies, must be suing or defending as executor, administrator, or in one of the other representative capacities
enumerated in the statute.
2. The witness must be either a party in interest or a party to the
record, and also he must be testifying in his own behalf.
3. The subject matter of the testimony objected to must be either

(a) as to a transaction had by the witness with the deceased or incompetent person, or (b) as to a statement made to the witness or to
another in his presence by such deceased or insane person or minor
under fourteen.
Where these three essentials are all present, and the case does not
come within the proviso to the proviso, the proviso applies and renders
the testimony inadmissible.
This may be expressed in the form of three questions or tests to be
applied in each case:
1. Is the party adverse to the witness (or to the party calling
him) suing or defending in one of the enumerated capacities?
2. Is the witness a party in interest or a party to the record, and
testifying in his own behalf ?
3. Is he testifying as to a transaction had by him with the deceased or incompetent person, or as to a statement made either to him
or in his presence by such person?
If all of these questions are answered in the affirmative, the case
comes within the proviso and the testimony is inadmissible. If any
one or more of the questions is answered in the negative the testimony is admissible. 14
Elwood Hutcheson.
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SCHOOL OF LAW.

